1 Macey and O'Hara (1997) note that brokers might justify non-NYSE routing of market orders if execution quality includes commissions, opportunity costs, price impact, and execution speed in addition to transaction price and Battalio, Hatch, and Jennings (1999) presents evidence consistent with their claim. 2 We refer to the original study, SEC (1997), instead of Lightfoot, Martin, Peterson, and Sirri (1997) because it is more detailed with respect to the analysis of limit orders.
Introduction
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires brokers to "regularly and rigorously examine execution quality likely to be obtained from the different markets or market makers trading a security" (SEC [1997] ). Academic execution-quality research finds that the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) offers investors better prices than alternative venues (see, e.g., Blume and Goldstein [1992] , Lee [1993] , Angel [1994a] , Petersen and Fialkowski [1994] , Ready [1999] , Ross, Shapiro and Smith [1996] , Bessembinder and Kaufman [1997] , SEC [1997] , and Battalio, Greene, and Jennings [1998] ). These studies' results suggest that brokers should route market orders to the NYSE. 1 Most execution-quality studies ignore limit orders despite the fact that they comprise a significant proportion of order flow (see, for example, Harris and Hasbrouck [1996] and SEC [1997] ). To our knowledge, SEC (1997) is the only multiple-exchange study of limit order execution quality. 2 Its results suggest that investors may prefer regional exchange limit order routing because orders are more likely to fill on the regionals than in New
York. SEC (1997) , however, takes the across-exchange mix of limit orders as exogenous. For example, 3 Both practices allow brokers to participate in the dealer revenue associated with executing their customers' orders. Internalization refers to the practice of brokers taking the other side of customers' orders. Payment for order flow implies that brokers receive direct cash payments for sending order flow to a particular dealer. 2 the SEC does not consider the possibility that the regionally-routed orders might have obtained better executions if sent to the NYSE. We investigate whether regional exchanges appear to offer limit order executions superior to the NYSE when market conditions and order characteristics are held constant.
Although trade price may be key to judge market order execution quality, non-price factors are critical to measure limit order execution quality. We compare fill rates, execution waits, and economic performance metrics on four regional exchanges with NYSE statistics using two tactics: an event study and simulation. The event study examines the execution quality of Merrill Lynch limit orders before and after it ceased routinely routing them to regional exchanges in favor of New York. The simulations simultaneously submit identical actual and hypothetical limit-order pairs to two market centers and estimate what would have happened to a regionally-routed order had it received NYSE routing while controlling order traits and market conditions. The regional exchanges we study provide executions that are comparable in quality to the NYSE for the samples' most frequently submitted type of limit order.
If brokers make limit order routing decisions based on perceived execution quality, then execution quality may be similar across trading venues in a frictionless equilibrium. Markets with high-quality trade attract more limit orders, lengthening the execution queue until traders are indifferent about where to send the next order. The market for order flow, however, is not frictionless. For example, brokers make routing decisions based on opportunities to internalize trade or receive payment for order flow (see SEC [1997] ).
3 Macey and O'Hara (1997) suggests that these frictions imply across-market differences in limit order execution quality. Specifically, internalization and payment-for-order-flow arrangements might target order flow rich in market orders because it is profitable for the dealer. Because internalization and orderflow payments are more prevalent on regional exchanges than the NYSE, the market-to-limit-order ratios 3 and, therefore, limit order fill rates may be higher away from New York. Alternatively, if the NYSE attracts relatively more market orders than other venues because of its high-quality executions, then the NYSE might provide better limit order executions. Although descriptive statistics in SEC (1997) indicate that the regional exchanges' market-to-limit ratios are higher than the NYSE's ratio, whether there are across-exchange differences in limit order execution quality is an unresolved empirical issue.
Extant limit-order research focuses on traders' use of limit orders, the returns generated by limitorder strategies, and limit orders' effects on markets. Kumar and Seppi (1993) , Angel (1994b) , Harris (1994) , Chakravarty and Holden (1995) , and Handa and Schwartz (1996) model the trader's decision to use limit orders. Handa and Schwartz (1996) and Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) find that limit order trading strategies may be profitable. Glosten (1994) , Bias, Hillion, and Spatt (1995) , Seppi (1997) , Parlour (1998) , and others examine how limit orders define and affect markets. Lo, MacKinlay, and Zhang (1997) model execution waits for limit orders using survival analysis. Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) and SEC (1997) document limit order execution quality, but neither paper addresses whether orders sent to one venue might receive better executions in another market. Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) , hereafter HH, compare the economic performance of NYSE limit and market orders using the Trades, Orders, Reports, and Quotes database. The HH ex-ante performance measure compares execution prices to submission-time quoted prices. Limit-order traders can obtain better prices than market-order traders when the limit orders fill. HH's ex-post metric examines whether limitorder traders provide valuable execution options to the market by comparing trade prices to quoted prices five minutes after execution. They find that stock prices fall (rise) after limit buy (sell) orders execute, suggesting that NYSE limit orders tend to execute when it is not in traders' best interests (i.e., limit-order traders bear adverse selection costs as described in Rock [1996] ). HH make no intermarket comparisons.
With 25% of NYSE-listed securities' trades occurring off the Exchange in 1998 (see NYSE [1999] ), examining limit order executions in other market centers seems worthwhile. 4 SEC (1997) documents fill rates and execution waits, and measures how prices move after limit orders execute on the NYSE and the regional exchanges. The SEC finds that limit orders fill more often on regional exchanges than on the NYSE. They also find that the NYSE's average execution wait is shorter than the regionals' for filled orders. Finally, post-trade price changes suggest that traders face similar adverse selection costs on all venues. Because SEC (1997) computes intermarket execution-quality statistics taking order routing choices as given, one must be careful making inferences from their results.
For example, the NYSE's fill rate for on-the-quote limit orders (i.e., buy limit orders at the contemporaneous best bid price and sell orders at the best offer price) is 45.5%, while 58.7% to 76.8% of these orders fill on regional exchanges. This suggests that on-the-quote limit orders are more likely to fill on the regionals than on the NYSE. The SEC does not ask, however, whether the regional orders might have enjoyed an even higher fill rate if routed to New York. Brokers may route orders to regional exchanges with their customers' best interests in mind. If so, then identical NYSE orders would provide execution quality no greater than that of the regional exchanges. Alternatively, conflicts of interest may prevent customers from obtaining the better executions available in New York. We conduct experiments designed to distinguish between these two possibilities. Specifically, we provide descriptive executionquality statistics and conduct an event study and several simulations.
We describe our data and discuss the event study in the following section. The event study evaluates the quality of Merrill Lynch limit order executions before and after it reroutes orders from the Boston and Pacific Exchanges to New York in October 1995. This experiment has the advantage of examining actual orders, but the potential disadvantage of not controlling market conditions or order features adequately. We find that fill rates are slightly higher before the switch but that filled orders' execution waits drop when all orders are routed to New York. This suggests that the NYSE and regional exchanges offer similar quality limit order executions.
We introduce our simulation methodology and document its accuracy in Section 3. The simula-4 Actually, we compare the regional execution statistics to an exchange displaying the same quoted prices and size as the NYSE but observing strict time priority with no hidden trading interests. The NYSE allows timepriority deviations and the "crowd" may choose to not display trading interests. We demonstrate in Section 3 that our approach accurately matches a sample of actual New York limit order executions. 5 A logical experiment to examine across-exchange execution quality is to submit identical orders to multiple trading venues simultaneously using on-line brokers allowing the trader to make the routing decision. Results from a broker-dealer performing this experiment on a small scale suggest that about 200 paired orders are needed to produce statistically-reliable distinctions between regional exchanges and the NYSE. Back-of-the-envelope calculations of the capital required render this approach infeasible. We also produce a matched sample of comparable limit orders naturally arriving at nearly the same time in our sample data. Unfortunately, after matching on order date, approximate order time, stock, side of market, and limit price, the sample size is too small to expect to make statistically reliable distinctions in execution quality between trading venues. 5 tions compare actual limit order executions with simultaneously-submitted, identical hypothetical NYSE limit orders. 4 Our methodology uses Trades and Quotes (TAQ) data to infer the NYSE limit-order queue when our hypothetical order is submitted, and estimates how TAQ-recorded NYSE trades and quotes affect our hypothetical order's standing in that queue. This permits us to control for order characteristics and market conditions. 5 For the types of limit orders studied, the simulation correctly classifies over 97% of a sample of NYSE orders as filled or unfilled and accurately estimates execution times.
Section 4 examines the execution quality of a sample of Philadelphia Stock Exchange (PHLX)
limit orders relative to our methodology's estimate of the execution quality these orders would have obtained on the NYSE. PHLX Rule 229.10 mandates that qualifying limit orders execute after 1,000
shares trade in New York at the limit price regardless of New York's submission-time quoted size. Thus, Philadelphia limit orders may execute before identical New York orders. Our findings suggest that Philadelphia offers higher fill rates, shorter execution waits, and better economic performance than the NYSE for the most popular category of PHLX Rule 229.10-eligible orders. These results are consistent with the claim that brokers routing qualifying orders to Philadelphia act in the customers' best interests. It may not be surprising, however, that a regional stock exchange with special rules for small limit orders outperforms the NYSE. We use more inclusive limit-order samples on the Boston, Cincinnati, and Pacific
Exchanges to obtain a broader picture of relative regional-exchange limit order execution quality.
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In Section 5, we investigate whether broker-dealers appear to enforce the Cincinnati Stock Exchange's (CSE) "New-York-or-better" limit order execution rule by comparing the execution quality of a sample of limit orders routed to CSE brokers with identical hypothetical NYSE limit orders. Under CSE Rule 11.9(u), a member holding a public, agency limit order must execute the order if it is due an execution on Cincinnati or if it would have executed had it been routed to New York. We conclude that the CSE broker-dealers meet the standard for the most commonly submitted type of limit order but fall short of the mandate for a second popular order type. In Section 6, we conduct a similar analysis using Merrill Lynch data from the Boston Stock Exchange and the Pacific Exchange. Although the small sample size may limit our ability to conclude otherwise, our results suggest that both regional exchanges offer execution quality that is no different than the NYSE. Section 7 summarizes and concludes.
Data and Descriptive Statistics

Data Sources
We obtain audit-trail order data from the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, the Cincinnati Stock Exchange, and Merrill Lynch. The data include security symbol, order type, order submission date and time, order size and price, an indication of whether the order is buyer or seller initiated, the order's time in force, and a settlement code. The data also note if the order is canceled. For executed orders, we know the date and time of the execution as well as the trade size and price. Data from Merrill Lynch include the trading venue (Boston, New York, or Pacific). We examine non-marketable limit orders (i.e., a buy order's limit price is less than the contemporaneous National Best Offer price and a sell order's limit price exceeds the National Best Bid price). We exclude orders for non-regular settlement and orders associated with trades reported late or out of sequence. We include canceled orders.
Philadelphia Stock Exchange data are obtained from November 1, 1995 , through January 31, 1996 . We obtain data from five Cincinnati Stock Exchange broker-dealers for the period January 20-24, 1997. Merrill Lynch data are from October and November 1995. Merrill's NYSE system (SuperDOT) 7 order data are available electronically, but its regional data are hand-gathered from hard-copy reports.
This limits our regional-exchange analysis of Merrill orders to five trading days in October and five trading days in November; October 2-6 and November 17, [27] [28] [29] [30] 1995 . In October, Merrill routes orders to the Boston, Pacific, and New York Stock Exchanges. In November, its orders go to the NYSE.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 summarizes our data collection experience and provides descriptive statistics.
[Insert Table 1 .]
The Cincinnati and Merrill data include all limit orders during the sample periods. Philadelphia provides only non-marketable orders. From the orders provided, we eliminate orders for fewer than 100 shares to produce the numbers displayed in the first row. We exclude odd-lots because they are not recorded in the publicly-available trade data used in our simulation analysis. We also eliminate good-'til-canceled orders, assuming that the trading strategies producing these orders differ from the strategies producing day orders.
Day orders represent 47% of the orders in Philadelphia (recall we did not obtain marketable limit orders), 62% of the Cincinnati orders, and 66% of Merrill's limit orders. Our analyses require a valid quote when the order is submitted, which we obtain from the TAQ files. We construct a National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO) quote stream and use the last recorded quote prior to the order's receipt as the benchmark quote.
A valid quote has non-zero bid and offer prices and associated sizes, a National Best Bid (NBB) price less than the National Best Offer (NBO) price, and a NBBO spread less than $5.00. Requiring that an order execute completely to be considered filled produces fill rates ranging from 50% for Cincinnati to 66% in Philadelphia. The Cincinnati rate is significantly less than the rate from each of the other samples and the Philadelphia figure is significantly greater than each other sample (again, aggregating Merrill's October data). Execution waits are significantly longer in the aggregated October
Merrill data (due to the Pacific data) than on any other exchange. The Panel B data also provide insights into the potential problems with making intermarket execution-quality comparisons. Except for Cincinnati, which we return to below, each regional exchange exhibits significantly (Boston at the .05 level, Philadelphia and Pacific at the .01 level) higher fill rates than the NYSE. The average NYSE order size, however, is significantly larger than the order sizes on the regional exchanges. Because we require all shares in an order execute before categorizing the order as a fill, this may explain fill-rate differences.
Panel C reports the distribution of limit prices relative to the NBBO and the associated fill rates.
As in Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) , the most popular non-marketable limit orders are on-the-quote orders (orders to buy at the NBB or sell at the NBO). Although the NYSE's fill rate for on-the-quote (hereafter, OTQ) orders is greater than the comparable fill rate in SEC (1997), the regional exchanges' fill rates 6 See "Merrill Shifts on Small Investors ' Orders," Wall Street Journal, October 20, 1995, and Jennings (1998) . Conversations with Merrill officials verify the accuracy of this story. For the affected securities, the decision whether to route the order to the regional or the national exchange was based primarily on the order's size. 9 exceed the NYSE's for these orders as in SEC (1997) . In all but the Cincinnati data, the second most frequent order is a quote-improving order (one with a limit price between the current quoted prices).
Contrary to SEC (1997), we find that the NYSE has the highest fill rate for quote-improving (hereafter, QI) orders. This difference in findings is probably because our samples contain only the most actively traded NYSE-listed stocks. Finally, it is interesting to note that Cincinnati has a competitive fill rate in most of the limit-price categories. Why, then, is the CSE's overall fill rate (Panel B) the lowest? Panel C also reveals that the Cincinnati limit order prices tend to be further from the NBBO than orders on the other market centers. For Philadelphia and Merrill orders, 69% of the limit orders are QI or OTQ orders. For Cincinnati, those orders comprise 48% of the limit orders. This reinforces the idea that care must be taken when making unconditional, across-exchange comparisons of limit order fill rates.
A Natural Experiment
On October 20, 1995, the Wall Street Journal reported that Merrill Lynch would cease routinely sending small, retail orders in securities listed on the New York and American Stock Exchanges to Merrillaffiliated regional specialists.
Before the rerouting, our sample data indicate that the BSE received 20% and the PCX received 24% of Merrill's limit orders (in different stocks), leaving about 56% for the NYSE. The rerouting is complete, no sample November limit orders go to the regional exchanges.
We use Merrill's policy change to conduct an event study with the 3,467 non-marketable day limit orders in the affected stocks. We divide these orders into two samples. The 'Boston' sample contains all orders in the stocks for which Merrill chose between Boston and New York routing in October regardless of the market center receiving the order. The 'Pacific' sample includes all orders in the stocks for which Merrill decided between the PCX and the NYSE in October regardless of the receiving venue. Because Merrill routed each stock to but one regional, these samples are mutually exclusive. The Boston sample contains 1,528 orders; 378 orders routed to Boston in October (see Table 1 ), 268 NYSE orders in October, and and 882 NYSE orders in November. The Pacific sample has 1,939 orders; 469 PCX October orders (see Table 1 ), 576 to New York in October, and 894 to New York in November. We compare fill rates and execution waits in October and November. We combine the regionally-routed and the NYSE-routed orders for the October calculations in order to represent the entire package of limit orders in the affected stocks during that period. All November orders receive NYSE routing. Because Merrill's routing decision considered order size during October, Table 2 reports the results of the analysis conditional on order size categories determined by the automatic execution maxima on the relevant regional exchange.
[Insert Table 2 .] Panel A reports execution-quality statistics for the Boston sample stocks. The November small, QI orders' fill rate is significantly greater than October's analogous rate at the .05 level. Conversely, the fill rate for small orders with limit prices away from the NBBO falls significantly (again at the .05 level) after the switch to exclusive NYSE routing. Small, OTQ orders experience almost an identical fill rate in the two sample periods. The overall small-order fill rate (not reported in Table 2 ) falls from 57% in October to 54% in November, a decrease that is not statistically significant at traditional significance levels. For executed small orders, execution waits are insignificantly shorter after the switch. Wait times are generally longer for large orders after the rerouting, although only the wait for orders with a limit price away from the NBBO is significantly longer. Our analysis shows that, on average, Boston sample stocks' October execution-quality measures are comparable to the November execution-quality measures. Because the major (known) difference between the two sample periods is the market center to which the majority of the small orders are routed, we conclude that the routing change has little impact on the average Merrill limitorder trader in these stocks. We do find, however, that orders with limit prices that are inside of the existing NYSE quote fill more frequently in November, when they are routed exclusively to the NYSE.
Execution quality for the Pacific sample stocks is reported in Panel B. The fill rate for small, QI orders increases significantly (at the .10 level) in November, suggesting that October's execution quality is lower than November's. Small, OTQ orders fill significantly (at the .01 level) less frequently in November, suggesting that October's execution quality exceeds November's. These changes offset so the overall smallorder fill rate (not reported) does not differ significantly between October and November at traditional levels. Execution times for small QI and OTQ orders fall (although only at the .10 significance level) between October and November, suggesting that the rerouting results in faster executions for filled orders.
As with the Boston sample, small quote-improving orders in the Pacific sample stocks appear to execute more frequently and more quickly when routed to the NYSE than when they are routed to the PCX. Onthe-quote orders, however, fill less frequently when routed exclusively to New York in November.
Assuming that: 1.) the order submission strategies of Merrill's day, limit-order traders are identical in October and November; and, 2.) market conditions are unchanged between the two sample months, the event study suggests that quote-improving orders fill more often and faster on the NYSE but that regional exchanges offer execution quality at least as high as the NYSE for other limit orders. Events like these do not, however, occur frequently enough to monitor relative execution quality as mandated in SEC (1997).
In the remainder of the paper, we develop a simulation methodology that estimates if/when limit orders 12 execute while controlling market conditions and order submission strategies, show that the technique is accurate, and use the methodology to evaluate decisions to route limit orders away from the NYSE.
Methodology
Introduction
In this section, we develop a simulation methodology to estimate if/when certain types of limit orders execute. Using actual NYSE limit orders as a benchmark, we test our procedure by submitting identical, hypothetical orders and comparing the actual orders' fill rates, execution waits, and economic performance measures to the hypothetical orders' statistics. The simulation is designed specifically for quote-improving and on-the-quote limit orders and accurately replicates their outcomes. 7 We use the process in the following sections to estimate what would have happened had regionally-routed orders been routed to the NYSE instead. We do this by "submitting" an identical hypothetical NYSE order when an actual order arrives at a regional, using our algorithm to track the hypothetical order's standing in the limitorder queue, and comparing the hypothetical NYSE order's execution quality to that of the actual regional order. 8 We also develop a measure of the economic importance of fill-rate differences.
The Simulation Methodology
Our simulation presumes that the NYSE fully displays all public trading interests, enforces time priority equally for all displayed trading interests, and follows strict time priority. 9 To determine our orders (e.g., see Dow Jones News Service [2000] ). New York Stock Exchange (1999), Sofianos and Werner (1997) , and Kavajecz (1999) note the importance of specialists/floor brokers in the NYSE's quoting and trading processes. Finally, NYSE Rule 72 allows violations of strict time priority. Violations of the first and third assumptions suggest that our imputed queue length is too short and violations of the second assumption suggests that our estimated queue length is too long. Partitioning the sample by attributes extant research finds related to specialist participation in the quoting/trading process does not substantively change the conclusions from those reported in the paper. Modifying the simulation to allow for large orders to "size-out" the limit order book also does not change our conclusions. 10 We also note apparent cancellations of orders with higher time priority than ours. For example, if we submit an OTQ order and find that the subsequent relevant quote size is less than our estimated queue length, then we presume that orders with higher time priority than ours are canceled and move our order that much closer to the front of the queue. Based on Hasbrouck, Sofianos, and Sosebee (1993) , we subtract 6 seconds from the TAQ-recorded trade times. 13 hypothetical order's standing in the limit-order queue, we examine the TAQ-recorded quote existing when we "submit" the hypothetical order. Because we must observe recorded size to estimate the queue's length at submission time, we can examine only orders with limit prices matching or bettering the existing NYSE quote, i.e., OTQ and QI limit orders. For each actual buy (sell) order, we place an identical hypothetical order in line behind the existing orders on the bid-side (offer-side) of the order-receipt-time NYSE quote.
For QI orders, price priority suggests that our order is first in the queue. For OTQ orders, time priority suggests that our order is behind orders already in line. After our order is submitted, we examine subsequent TAQ-recorded quotes and trades. Our order is presumed to execute when: 1.) the cumulative number of shares executing at the limit price after the order arrives equals the submission-time queue length plus the order's size 10 ; 2.) we observe a trade price less (greater) than the price at which we are willing to buy (sell); or 3.) we observe a revision in the order-receipt-time quoted price such that the bid (offer) price is less (greater) than our limit price and the benchmark quote. In the first case, sufficient shares trade to exhaust the queue in front of and execute our order. The fill time associated with a hypothetical order presumed to execute in this fashion is the time of the trade in which the cumulative volume at the limit price since submission equals or exceeds the required volume. In the latter two cases, trading does not eliminate the shares in the limit order queue with higher time priority than our order.
Apparently, traders with higher time priority cancel orders. Here, the hypothetical order's fill time is 11 If the buy order's price is $20.125, then our order is at the front of the limit order queue and executes when 200 shares trade at $20.125 (or when we observe a transaction price less than $20.125 or a bid price less than $20.00). 14 assumed to be the time of the last trade at the limit price prior to observing the inferior price. Orders (hypothetical or actual) must fill completely to be classified as filled.
An example may help illustrate our methodology. Suppose a 200-share buy limit order with a price of $20.00 per share is submitted at 10:00 on a given day. The contemporaneous NYSE quote is $20.00 bid for 4,000 shares and $20.25 offered. Our data tell us if and when the actual order fills. We assume that the simulated order queues behind the 4,000 shares on the limit-order book at $20 and begin tracking quotes and trades. The order executes when the 4,200th (4,000 shares in the bid plus the 200-share order size) share trades at $20 on the NYSE after our order arrives. So, if we observe a 2,000-share trade at $20 at 10:12, another 2,000-share trade at $20 at 10:14, and a $20, 200-share trade at 10:18, then we assume the hypothetical order executes at 10:18. Alternatively, we may find a trade or bid price less than $20. If an inferior price is observed, then we assume that the hypothetical order executes at the time of the last trade at $20 prior to the inferior price (or when the order is submitted if no trade at $20 is observed between when the order is submitted and when we observe the inferior price). Again, suppose a 200-share limit buy order arrives at 10:00 with a $20 limit price. If we observe a trade at $20 at 10:10 and the bid price falls to (or a trade executes at) $19.875 at 10:12, then we assume our order executes at 10:10.
The hypothetical order's outcome (an execution at 10:18 or 10:10) is compared to the actual order's outcome. 11 We evaluate differences in fill rates, fill waits, and economic performances.
To test our methodology, we analyze a sample of actual NYSE orders as if they were hypo-thetical orders. We use OTQ and QI day limit orders Merrill's customers submit during November 1995. We know actual submission times and (if executed or canceled) execution/cancellation times for these 12,581 orders (5,237 QI and 7,344 OTQ). For each order, we determine if/when our simulation method-ology indicates the order fills and compare the simulated outcome with the known actual outcome.
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Descriptive statistics on fill rates are displayed in Table 3 by order size and type.
[Insert Table 3 .]
About 90% of the filled hypothetical orders execute because sufficient shares trade at the limit price.
Before observing enough trading to exhaust the submission-time queue and execute our simulated order, we observe an inferior revised quoted price for more than 6% of the orders and an inferior trade price for almost 4%. These proportions differ for QI and OTQ orders. Almost all of the hypothetical QI orders execute when cumulative trading volume equal to the order's size occurs at the limit price on the NYSE.
More than 11% of the OTQ hypothetical orders fill because an inferior (revised) quoted price occurs. The hypothetical fill rate for QI orders exceeds the actual fill rate by just over one percentage point. For OTQ orders, the hypothetical fill rate is within 0.62% of the actual. Chi-squared tests of differences in proportions cannot reject the null hypothesis that the hypothetical fill rate equals the actual rate for any order-type/size category. In addition, the simulation correctly classifies 97.56% of the hypothetical orders as either filled or unfilled. Finally, it is almost equally likely for the simulation to incorrectly classify an OTQ order as filled or unfilled (particularly for the smaller order sizes). For QI orders, the simulation is more likely to fill orders not actually executing than it is to not fill an executed actual order, but it correctly classifies 98.64% of the orders as filled or not.
In Table 4 , we report the distribution of differences in execution wait-times for the 8,428 orderpairs (the hypothetical order paired with the identical real order) with both orders executing.
[Insert Table 4 .]
Regardless of order size and type, the median difference between the estimated and actual order fill time is only three or four seconds, with the hypothetical order executing before the actual. This three second difference is associated with a mean wait time of about 1.5 minutes for quote-improving orders (a 3.4% error). On-the-quote orders have a mean wait time of nearly 16 minutes, implying that the three second difference represents an error of 0.3%. The hypothetical order executes after the actual order (a negative execution wait difference) in only 22% of the order-pairs. For a small portion of OTQ orders, the hypothetical order fills considerably after the actual order (the 10th percentile of the distribution is about 7.5 minutes). In over 82% of the cases, the hypothetical order executes within one minute of the actual.
Estimating Economic Performance
Fill rates and execution waits are descriptive statistics associated with limit order execution quality. Typically, we assume that filled orders are preferred to unfilled orders and that, conditional on filling, shorter execution waits are better. This ordering, however, does not take us as far as we might like in evaluating execution quality. We might, for example, wish to estimate the economic impact of an order routing decision on the trader. To do so, we compute the aggregate value of the positions taken when routing limit orders to a given venue and compare that to the value of the acquired positions when routing the same package of limit orders to an alternative venue. Suppose, for example, that we send 100 identical limit orders to two market centers simultaneously and that Venue A fills all of the orders filled at Venue B plus ten orders that Venue B does not fill. Clearly, Venue A's fill rate exceeds Venue B's fill rate by ten percentage points. We wish to estimate what the additional ten fills are worth to the trader. If these ten trades are profitable to the trader, then the fill-rate differential is economically meaningful. Alternatively, the ten additional trades may mean little to the trader economically. Subtracting the total one-day, dollar return on the trader's portfolio acquired when routing the orders to Venue B from the total one-day, dollar return on the trader's portfolio from routing the same orders to Venue A measures the relative economic advantage of Venue A over Venue B. This advantage can be substantial when the stock's price "touches" the limit price briefly and then moves away. If Venue A consistently executes orders under these circumstances, then its advantage over Venue B is meaningful. Harris and Habrouck (1996) suggest an approach to measuring the economic performance of limit orders. Our economic performance measure, however, differs from their ex-ante measure. HH examine performance differences between two trading strategies; one using limit orders and the other using market orders. Implicit in the HH ex-ante measure is the assumption that the target stock is traded without regard to price. In this paper, we examine the performance of identical limit orders routed to different market centers. Investors using limit orders may be more patient than the HH traders. Thus, we compute an economic performance measure similar to the HH ex-post measure. Specifically, we compute the implicit gain or loss from a filled limit order unwound at the close of the day it executes. For a filled limit buy (sell)
order, we assume that the investor sells (buys) at the same-day closing quoted bid (offer) price. This figure represents the one-day dollar return on a filled limit order. We focus on the one-day return because we evaluate day limit orders. Aggregating across all filled orders from a set of submitted limit orders provides the value of the portfolio acquired by the day limit order trader. In the following sections of the paper, we compare the end-of-day portfolio value for the actual regionally-routed orders to the estimated end-of-day portfolio value for the hypothetical NYSE orders. If both the actual and hypothetical orders fill, then our economic performance measure for each order in the pair is identical. Likewise, opportunity losses for order-pairs in which neither order fills are equal. Of interest are order-pairs in which one order in the pair fills and the other does not. The implicit one-day gain (loss) for the filled order in the pair measures how much the limit-order trader submitting the unfilled order in the pair lost (gained). We compute this performance measure for order-pairs in which the actual order fills and the hypothetical order does not and order-pairs for which the hypothetical order fills and the actual order does not. Subtracting the return associated with the order-pairs with the hypothetical order filling from the return associated with the orderpairs with the actual order filling provides an estimate of the economic (dis)advantage of regional-exchange routing relative to the NYSE. Dividing the aggregate value difference by the total number of shares in all the submitted orders provides the per share economic value of the routing decision for the sample package of limit orders. 12 This is not surprising. A negative return results from executed orders where traders experience regret, e.g., buying before a substantial price decline. It is unlikely that either the hypothetical or actual order fails to fill in these cases. Suppose we submit a buy order with a limit price equal to the best bid price of $30 when the best offer is $30.25. Further suppose that the security's ask price falls to $28 after the order is submitted and the order is not canceled. Even if sufficient shares do not trade at $30 to trigger a hypothetical fill, our simulation executes the hypothetical order when we observe a (revised) quoted or trade price below $30. It also seems unlikely that the actual order fails to fill. Analogously, if the bid price in the above example quickly rises to $32, then neither the actual order nor the hypothetical order is likely to fill. Situations in which the price changes dramatically after the order is submitted are unlikely to be included in our economic performance evaluation because both orders fill or both remain unfilled. This suggests that the order-pairs likely to be included in our performance measure are those associated with small positive returns. Thus, our economic performance measure, by examining only order-pairs with exactly one order filling, is likely to differ from the negative performance measures of Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) and SEC (1997) that include all filled orders. 18 decisions because both the actual and hypothetical order go to the NYSE. Instead, these numbers allow us to assess bias in our simulation methodology.
[Insert Table 5 .]
All but one of the returns are positive and most are small. 12 To estimate net economic performance, we subtract the total return associated with the order-pairs filling hypothetically but not actually from the total return associated with the order-pairs filling only the actual order. This is the net economic performance for the total package of orders submitted, because order-pairs with both orders filling or both orders not filling have zero net economic value. For our validation, this is a package of 5,237 QI orders and 7,344
OTQ orders (see Table 3 Table 1 ), this is $0.00017 per share.
Summary
Overall, our simulation methodology produces an estimated fill rate within one percentage point of the actual fill rate and properly fills or does not fill the hypothetical order in 97.56% of the cases. Although the wait-time difference between actual and hypothetical OTC order can be large, the overall median execution wait-time differential is only three seconds. This lack of significant bias extends to our measure 13 Agency orders of less than a predetermined maximum size in stocks with bid prices greater than or equal to $1.00 qualify for PACE. Brokers can request their orders not be subject to these execution rules.
19 of economic performance. We find that the economic difference between the hypothetical and actual executions for our sample package of orders is less than two one-hundredths of a cent per share. In the following sections, we compare actual regional-exchange limit order execution quality to the estimated execution quality that would have obtained if the order had been sent to the NYSE.
Exchange Execution Systems -Philadelphia Stock Exchange Rule 229.10
Introduction
The Philadelphia Stock Exchange Automated Communication and Execution (PACE) System provides automatic order routing/execution under predetermined conditions. 13 Although all exchanges have automated order-routing systems, PACE includes apparently unique provisions regarding limit orders.
PHLX Rule 229.10 mandates that, upon obtaining time priority on the PHLX, 100 to 599-share, nonmarketable limit orders in stocks listed on the national exchanges are due an execution no later than when 1,000 shares of the stock trade at the limit price or better on the primary exchange. Philadelphia or when 1,000 shares trade at that price in New York, whichever occurs first. Although executions are manual, PACE notifies PHLX specialists that an eligible limit order is due an execution each time New York trades for at least 1,000 shares accumulate at the limit price. This 1,000-share queue is independent of the actual receipt-time quoted size at that price in New York. Thus, Philadelphia customers may move ahead of traders placing limit orders in New York (although it is possible that the PHLX trader may do worse than NYSE traders if there are many orders at the limit price in Philadelphia 14 Note that the number of QI and OTQ orders here differs from that in Table 1 for the PHLX. In Table 1 , we use the NBBO to classify orders. Here we use the NYSE quote because we submit the hypothetical order to the NYSE. The number of NYSE-QI orders exceeds the number of NBBO-QI orders in Table 1 because the NYSE is not always at the NBBO. This disclaimer also applies to the other samples discussed later in the paper.
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and little quoted size in New York). An order with a limit price bettering the existing NBB(O), e.g., an order with a limit price of $20.125, becomes part of the NBBO and is due an execution when the first opposite-side trading interest of sufficient size arrives at any trading venue.
Fill Rates, Economic Performance, and Execution Waits of Limit Orders: PHLX vs. NYSE
From Table 1 , we find that there are 43,033 Philadelphia non-marketable, day limit orders with valid reference quotes. To assess whether there is an advantage to placing these orders in Philadelphia rather than on the NYSE, we compare the results of actual Philadelphia orders to identical hypothetical NYSE orders. We use the TAQ-recorded NYSE quote when an actual Philadelphia day limit order arrives to estimate the NYSE's queue length. Thus, we are constrained to evaluating orders with limit prices that either equal or better the NYSE quote. The Philadelphia data contain 9,558 day limit orders that are quoteimproving relative to the contemporaneous NYSE quoted price and 20,667 limit orders that are on-thequote relative to the NYSE quote.
14 Almost 70% of these orders (21,014) qualify for PHLX Rule 229.10.
For each sample order, we simultaneously place an identical hypothetical order at the back of our estimated NYSE book. Our hypothetical NYSE order executes based on the algorithm described in Section 3. This allows us to estimate the improvement (if any) in the likelihood of filling, the wait for execution, and the economic performance offered by Philadelphia relative to the NYSE. Table 6 reports fill rates and waits and performance measures for the 30,225 sample order-pairs.
[Insert Table 6 .]
Panel A reports fill rates. Of the 6,618 OTQ orders unfilled on both the PHLX and the NYSE, 1,880 orders execute in Philadelphia but not (given our estimation technique) in New York, 561 orders execute in 15 Although canceled Philadelphia orders are unfilled, we give hypothetical NYSE orders an opportunity to fill. If the NYSE order fills before the PHLX order cancels, then the NYSE order is considered filled. If the NYSE order is unfilled when the Philadelphia order cancels, then we also cancel the NYSE order. Thus, although the PHLX's fill rate for canceled orders is zero by definition, the NYSE's fill rate for canceled Philadelphia orders may be positive. 16 Substantially more hypothetical QI orders fill because we observe a trade price that is inferior to our limit price in this simulation than in Section 3's test of the methodology. This is probably because an actual NYSE limit order exists in our validation test, but does not in the simulation. We presume that the QI limit order executes when we observe sufficient trading at the limit price (classified as a Shares execution) or worse (classified as a Trade execution) on the NYSE. When the actual limit order exists, it is more likely that we observe an execution at the limit price. This distinction affects the classification of that execution, not if/when the order executes. The NYSE fill rate exceeds the PHLX's for large OTQ orders. Each difference is statistically significant at the .01 level. Finding that Philadelphia outperforms the NYSE for eligible orders but not for large orders is consistent with the claim that PHLX Rule 229.10 offers qualifying OTQ limit-order traders an opportunity to improve upon fill rates they might receive on the NYSE. The NYSE fill rate for QI orders significantly exceeds Philadelphia's for both order-size categories. Furthermore, these fill-rate differences (particularly for large orders) exceed the roughly one percentage point difference between the actual and hypothetical
November Merrill Lynch orders used to validate the simulation (see Section 3).
16
Fill rates suggest that the PHLX limit-order trader enjoys an advantage over the NYSE trader for small, OTQ limit orders. For large, OTQ orders and for QI orders, the NYSE appears to offer higher fill rates than Philadelphia. Although the differences in fill rates are statistically significant, it is difficult to assess their economic importance. Filled orders economically benefit traders if security prices rise (fall) after buy (sell) orders execute. Conversely, traders experience regret if post-trade security prices move against them. To measure economic performance, we compute one-day returns for the package of limit orders sent to the PHLX and the identical package of hypothetical orders placed on the NYSE. The difference between these returns represents occasions where the stock's price touches the limit price but 22 only one exchange fills the order before the price moves away and provides an estimate of the net economic value of the routing decision. Dividing this net return by the total PHLX-sample shares in the order category (regardless of whether the order is from an order-pair with only one order filling) yields an estimate of the per share incremental benefit of the higher Philadelphia fill rate to the limit-order trader. If the orders filled only in Philadelphia are associated with small returns, then our measure suggests the higher PHLX fill rate has little economic significance.
Panel B reports the per share economic performance measures for order-pairs in which only the actual or only the hypothetical order executes and the net total economic performance for each category. To assess execution waits, we examine the 22,475 orders executing on both venues in Panel C. filled OTQ orders of 600 or more shares favor New York. Both the small-and large-trade mean time differences are significant at the .01 level. Furthermore, although the Philadelphia order executes no later than the NYSE order in 46% of the small-order order-pairs, that happens in only 19% of the order-pairs for 600 or more shares. These findings reinforce the claim that the PHLX Rule 229.10 enhances the Philadelphia's limit order execution performance relative to the NYSE's.
Summary
We find that small, OTQ limit orders in Philadelphia appear to obtain higher execution quality than they would have received had they been routed to the NYSE. Specifically, we find that actual Philadelphia limit orders execute more frequently and that the executed PHLX orders fill faster than the matched hypothetical NYSE limit orders. Furthermore, the net one-day return associated with being routed to the PHLX rather than to New York is $0.0160 per share for these orders. Conversely, we find that large OTQ orders and QI orders routed to Philadelphia are filled less often and that filled orders take longer to execute than identical hypothetical orders routed to the NYSE. Combining all orders, we estimate that the Philadelphia fill rate is four percentage points higher and the one-day return is $0.0039 greater on the PHLX than it would have been on the NYSE. This suggests that the PHLX-sample limit order package benefited by being routed to Philadelphia rather than New York. These results may not be too surprising on a regional exchange having rules designed to provide such an advantage. In the following sections, we examine data from other regional exchanges to determine the generality of this conclusion.
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Preferencing Dealers on the Cincinnati Stock Exchange
Introduction
In 1976, the Cincinnati Stock Exchange de-emphasized its physical trading floor and initiated an automated market with competing market makers. Currently, trading is conducted electronically via the National Securities Trading System (NSTS). The NSTS provides communication, order delivery and execution, and reporting capabilities to dealers in diverse locations. Members can display limit orders in a central book and use the system to automatically execute orders based on priority rules. Market orders execute with the Designated Dealer (the CSE specialist) based on price and time priority, unless the firm entering the order indicates that a particular dealer is to receive the order (i.e., the broker "preferences" a particular dealer). Preferencing weakens time priority, but requires that the preferenced dealer provide a price no worse than the NBBO. It is possible for a brokerage firm to internalize orders by preferencing an affiliated dealer, e.g., Olde Discount Brokerage may own a CSE dealer to whom they send orders. If the broker wishes to internalize the order, then the broker sends both sides of the trade to NSTS (the brokermember on one side and the associated market maker on the other). After clearing public orders in the central limit order book at the same price, the order executes. SEC (1997) finds that the Cincinnati Stock Exchange had 72 members, 13 Designated Dealers, and 7 preferencing dealers in mid-1997. 17 Although the Cincinnati Stock Exchange does not attempt to provide its limit-order traders an explicit advantage over New York traders, CSE Rule 11.9 (u) requires members to benchmark limit order executions to New York. This rule states that public, agency limit orders must execute if the quoted size on the relevant side of the submission-time primary-market quote is exhausted or if the primary market's price becomes more favorable to the customer than the limit price. Brokers monitor what would have happened 18 Other regionals have similar rules. See, for example, Boston Stock Exchange Rules, Chapter II, Section 33; and Chicago Stock Exchange Article XX, Rule 37 (a).
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if the order had gone to New York instead of Cincinnati and execute the order when it is due an execution on either exchange. To monitor New York, brokers use a methodology similar to that described in Section 3 or actually submit the limit order (or a small "marker" order at the same limit price) to New York. The order executes when it reaches the front of either exchange's queue. To determine if Cincinnati dealers appear to enforce this New-York-or-better standard, we use audit-trail order data for five preferencing broker-dealers. We note when a Cincinnati broker-dealer receives a limit order in a NYSE-listed common stock that is QI or OTQ in New York and place an identical, hypothetical limit order simultaneously on the NYSE. We use our estimate of if/when the NYSE orders execute and the actual CSE execution data to compare the likelihood of execution, the timeliness of the execution, and orders' economic performance. Fill-rate comparisons use all 5,713 QI and OTQ orderpairs. About 29% of the orders do not execute on both the Cincinnati and the NYSE and are dropped from our execution-wait analysis, which uses a sample of 4,070 order-pairs. To analyze economic performance, we focus on the 368 order-pairs filling on only one venue. Table 7 provides fill rates and waits and economic performance metrics for the CSE sample.
Fill Rates, Economic Performance, and Time to Execution: CSE versus NYSE
[Insert Table 7 .] Panel A reports average fill rates for the five sample dealers. Of the 1,643 qualifying orders not filling on both exchanges, there are 1,275 orders not filling on either exchange, 188 orders filling on the CSE but not on the NYSE, and 180 orders executing on the NYSE but not on the CSE. For OTQ orders, the Cincinnati fill rate is 71.48% and the New York rate is 70.45%. A Chi-square test of proportions finds that the OTQ fill-rate difference (either overall or conditional on order size) is not significant at traditional levels. As in Philadelphia, the NYSE provides significantly higher fill rates than Cincinnati for QI orders. If we accurately estimate New York executions, then these results suggest that the CSE brokers fulfill the NewYork-or-better execution standard for OTQ orders but fall short for QI orders.
The economic performance measures in Panel B reinforce the fill-rate results. We find that Cincinnati provides an economic disadvantage for QI orders and an economic advantage for OTQ orders.
The higher NYSE fill rate for QI orders results in an economic performance measure favoring the NYSE by $0.0134 per QI share, a figure that is the same order of magnitude as deep-discount commissions for orders of this size. Although the OTQ fill rate difference between the CSE and the NYSE is small, orders filling on Cincinnati but not on the NYSE tend to have larger per share gains for the trader than orders filling on the NYSE but not on the CSE. This results in a $0.0071 per share advantage for OTQ 27 Cincinnati orders. On net, investors appear to be better off with the CSE routing by $18,248.375 (= $27,718.88 -9,470.50) or $0.0040 per share.
In Panel C, we report execution-wait statistics. Mean and median wait times for filled QI limit orders are similar on the NYSE and the CSE. The mean wait for OTQ orders is significantly shorter on Cincinnati than the estimated mean NYSE wait. In contrast to the difference in OTQ mean wait times, which favor the CSE, the NYSE order fills after the Cincinnati order in only 34.54% of the order-pairs.
This suggests that, although the NYSE order typically fills first, large wait-time advantages tend to favor Cincinnati. Although not reported in Table 7 , the Cincinnati order fills within one minute of the New York hypothetical order in over 48% of the OTQ order-pairs. This is consistent with the claim that CSE dealers monitor NYSE executions and execute Cincinnati orders in reaction to trades in New York.
Summary
In contrast to PHLX Rule 229.10, which appears to produce a higher fill rate for eligible OTQ orders than is available in New York, print protection rules on the Cincinnati Stock Exchange produce OTQ fill rates that are comparable to the NYSE. We estimate, however, that the OTQ orders filling only on the CSE are more valuable to traders than those filling only in New York by $0.0071 per share. In addition, average OTQ-order execution waits are shorter on Cincinnati than we estimate they would have been on the NYSE. We find QI orders routed to the CSE fill less often than identical hypothetical NYSE orders. For QI orders, the one-day return associated with NYSE routing rather than CSE routing is $0.0134 per share. Comparing the total package of actual limit orders with a package of identical hypothetical orders, we find that fill rates and execution waits are nearly identical. The one-day return for the limit order package is $0.0040 higher on the CSE than we estimate it would have been had the package been routed to the NYSE, which suggests that traders might not object to the Cincinnati routing. 19 Recall that the regional exchange data from Merrill had to-the-minute time stamps. This requires us to delete orders arriving during a minute in which the NYSE quote changes because we cannot classify the order as QI or OTQ.
Merrill Lynch Limit Orders
Introduction
28
Finally, we use our Merrill Lynch data to compare actual limit order execution quality on the Boston Stock Exchange and the Pacific Exchange to the execution quality of identical, hypothetical limit orders submitted to the NYSE. Because Merrill's rerouting decision leaves no regional-exchange orders in our November sample period, this comparison uses our October Merrill data. As with the Philadelphia and the Cincinnati comparisons, the order's limit price must be such that the hypothetical NYSE order is either QI or OTQ for us to infer the order's standing in the NYSE queue.
19 Merrill customers submit 634 such day limit orders in the relevant securities during our five-day October sample period; 277 in Boston and 357 to the Pacific. Of the orders submitted, 178 BSE order-pairs and 258 PCX order-pairs fill on both the regional exchange and in New York. Conversely, 151 orders fill on neither venue (72 Boston orders and 79
Pacific orders). Twenty-three orders fill on the regional but not on the NYSE (14 Boston and 9 Pacific) and 24 fill on the NYSE but not on the regional (13 Boston and 11 Pacific). Table 8 provides fill rates and waits and performance measures for the October Merrill sample.
Fill Rates, Economic Performance, and Time to Execution: BSE and PCX versus NYSE
[Insert Table 8 .]
In Panel A, we see that the estimated NYSE fill rate for QI orders is insignificantly higher than either regional rate. Boston provides an insignificantly higher OTQ fill rate than we estimate these orders would have obtained on the NYSE. The hypothetical NYSE fill rate for Pacific OTQ orders is identical to the actual fill rate. With no fill-rate difference statistically significant at traditional levels, we cannot make routing decisions based on the anticipated fill rate. Panel B reports economic performance measures.
None of the total return differences are large. Combining both regionals, there is a $413 (= $248.38 + $165.00) advantage to the regionals. This is $0.0013 per share of the combined total order flow to the two 29 exchanges during the October sample period. Overall, Boston traders appear to be economically better off when comparing the return from orders filling only in Boston to those filling only in New York. This advantage comes from the OTQ orders. For the Pacific, the economic advantage from the QI orders is offset by the OTQ disadvantage. In all cases, the sample sizes for the individual-exchange results are extremely small. The wait times reported in Panel C reinforce the notion that Boston provides comparable execution quality for limit orders. Mean and median Boston wait times are shorter than estimated NYSE times, with the mean OTQ (QI) wait time difference being statistically significant at the .01 (.10) level.
Furthermore, in 53% (42%) of the OTQ (QI) order-pairs, the actual Boston order executes first. On average, we estimate that filled PCX orders wait longer for execution than they would had they been submitted to the NYSE and find that in fewer than 28% of all order-pairs does the PCX order execute first.
Summary
In summary, we find no statistically reliable fill-rate differences between the actual orders routed to Boston and the PCX and what we estimate would have happened had these orders gone to the NYSE.
Although Boston appears to have an economic performance advantage over the NYSE, it is less than either Philadelphia or Cincinnati. The Pacific's net economic performance is nearly zero. We do find that filled orders appear to execute faster in Boston and slower on the Pacific than they would have in New York.
It is interesting to note that our simulation results contradict the conclusion of the event study
regarding the execution quality of QI and OTQ orders on the Pacific Exchange. In the event study, we find that November's OTQ fill rate is significantly less than October's and conclude that execution quality suffers when orders are rerouted exclusively to the NYSE. The event study, however, does not control for changes in market conditions between October and November. For example, Table 1 indicates that the NYSE's cancellation rate rises from 15.17% in October to 21.40% in November. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to model the change in cancellation frequency between November and October, the greater than six percentage point difference in the cancellation rate between the two adjacent months 30 suggests using caution when drawing precise inferences from our event study.
Summary and Conclusions
We use a natural experiment and simulation to investigate the quality of limit order executions on competing trading venues. Prior work on limit order execution quality either examines only one venue (e.g., the NYSE) or takes the order routing decision as exogenous. The latter approach is useful to document what occurs in various markets, but does not address the question of whether orders would receive better executions elsewhere. Can we conclude, for example, that regionally-routed limit orders would have received lower-quality executions had they been routed to the NYSE because limit orders submitted to regional exchanges generally have higher fill rates than NYSE orders (see SEC [1997] )?
Unless we believe that the regionals and New York receive the same types of orders in similar market conditions, we cannot reach such a conclusion from the SEC study.
Merrill Lynch's rerouting of limit orders in NYSE-listed securities from the Boston and Pacific
Exchanges to New York is our natural experiment. We compare limit order execution quality before and after the switch. Overall fill rates fall slightly afterwards for both the Boston and Pacific samples. The decline is statistically significant for Pacific-sample buy (sell) orders with limit prices equal to the existing bid (offer) price, the most commonly submitted type of order in our sample. Although execution waits for filled orders also fall when orders are rerouted to the NYSE, the lower New York fill rates suggest that regional exchanges offer competitive limit order executions. That Merrill's limit-order customers appear to be no better off after rerouting the orders contrasts with evidence in Battalio, Greene, and Jennings (1998) that Merrill's market-order customers seem to receive better trade prices on the NYSE.
We also develop and verify the accuracy of a simulation methodology designed to estimate outcomes of hypothetical New York limit orders. We use the size of the submission-time NYSE quote to estimate our hypothetical order's position in the limit order queue and monitor executions and quote 31 revisions to determine when our order "executes." Results of our validation test using actual NYSE day limit orders suggest that our methodology works well for the two types of limit orders examined. We use proprietary audit-trail databases of limit orders submitted to the Boston, Cincinnati, Philadelphia, and
Pacific Stock Exchanges to investigate whether limit orders submitted to these regional exchanges would have enjoyed higher quality executions if they had been submitted to the NYSE. For each qualifying regional limit order, we simultaneously "submit" an identical hypothetical New York limit order and compare actual regional fill rates, execution times, and economic performance measures to the hypothetical New York orders. Contrary to the findings of our event study and SEC (1997), our simulation results suggest that the NYSE offers overall limit order execution quality that is comparable to that offered by the regional stock exchanges. For orders with limit prices between the existing NYSE quotes, results
suggest that NYSE-routing would have improved execution quality. Specifically, the NYSE appears to offer higher fill rates and shorter execution waits than the Boston, Pacific, Cincinnati, and Philadelphia Stock Exchanges for these orders. This is not surprising because one downside of NYSE routing is the length of the typical limit order execution queue. For quote-improving orders, there is no queue so the more frequent arrival of sufficiently-large, opposite-sided market orders on the NYSE than on the regional exchanges allows the NYSE to outperform the regionals. The execution quality of buy (sell) orders with limit prices equal to the existing NYSE bid (offer) price is no worse and sometimes better on the regionals than we estimate it would have been had the orders been routed to the NYSE.
Our results suggest that, overall, the limit order routing decision has little impact on execution quality for the types of limit orders we examine when brokers make routing decisions based on stock and order size. Despite the existence of market frictions such as preferencing, internalization, and payment for order flow, market participants appear to respond so that fill rates for the total package of limit orders examined are nearly equal across market centers. This suggests that brokers can focus on analyzing the execution quality of market orders and marketable limit orders when determining where they should route 32 orders to trade NYSE-listed securities until order routing algorithms become more sophisticated. 3 The Merrill Lynch orders execute on the Boston Stock Exchange (BSE), the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and the Pacific Exchange (PCX) in October and the NYSE in November. 4 The data from the PHLX exclude marketable (i.e., buy orders with limit prices greater than or equal to the orderreceipt time National Best Offer price and sell orders with limit prices less than or equal to the order-receipt-time National Best Bid price) limit orders. The other data sources contain all limit orders. We eliminate orders for fewer than 100 shares. 5 GTC = good-'til-canceled. 6 At the time each order arrives at the trading venue of interest we require that National Best Bid and Offer prices exist (e.g., the market must be open), that the National Best Bid and Offer quoted prices have a positive size associated with them, and that the National Best Offer price exceed the National Best Bid price. In addition, because the Merrill Lynch data from the regional exchanges have only a to-the-minute time stamp, we require that both NBBO and NYSE quoted prices be stable during the minute of order arrival for these data. 7 Marketable buy (sell) orders have limit prices greater (less) than or equal to the National Best Offer (Bid) price. Because the Philadelphia data do not contain marketable limit orders, we eliminate them from all of the samples. 8 n.a. = not applicable. 9 NBBO quoted depth at the time of order submission in shares: bid (offer) for buy (sell) orders. 10 The difference between the National Best Offer and the National Best Bid prices at the time the order arrives. 11 The following seven lines sum to the number of sample orders. Quote improving orders have limit prices between the National Best Bid and Offer price. On-the-quote buy (sell) limit orders have limit prices equal to the National Best Bid (Offer) price. Other buy (sell) limit orders have limit prices less (greater) than the National Best Bid (Offer) price by the indicated amount. The first number in each cell is the number of orders falling in that category. The second number is the fill rate for that category. 1 BSE = Boston Stock Exchange. NYSE = New York Stock Exchange. QI = Quote Improving, i.e., a order with a limit price between the National Best Bid and Offer prices. OTQ = On the quote, i.e., a buy (sell) order with a limit price equal to the National Best Bid (Offer) price. Away = a buy (sell) order with a limit price less (more) than the National Best Bid (Offer). 2 The fill rate is the number of completely filled orders divided by the total number of orders. A chi-squared test with one degree of freedom is used to conduct a test of difference in proportions. One asterisk denotes significance at the .10 level, two denote significance at the .05 level, and three denote significance at the .01 level. 3 The wait time is the time elapsing between order submission and the complete filling of the order measured in minutes. It is computed only for completely filled orders. One asterisk indicates that the November mean wait time is statistically different at the .01 level from the analogous October rate using a two-sided t-test. Two (three) asterisks indicate that the difference is significant at the .05 (.01) level. 4 PCX = Pacific Exchange. The limit orders in this sample come from the Merrill-Lynch data described more fully in the paper. 2 QI = quote improving and OTQ = on the quote. A quote-improving limit order has a limit price between the contemporaneous bid and offer prices. An onthe-quote limit order is a buy (sell) limit order with a limit price equal to the contemporaneous bid (offer) price. 3 Hypothetical orders in the "Shares" column execute because the number of shares executing at the limit price after the submission time equals the depth associated with the limit price at the time the limit order is submitted plus the size of the order. Hypothetical orders in the "Trade" ("Quote") column execute because we observe a transaction (quote) price that is inferior to the limit price (order-receipt-time quoted price). 4 The fill rate is the number of orders completely filled on the day submitted divided by the number of orders submitted. 5 Agree = the simulation correctly classified the order as filled or unfilled. False Pos. = the simulation indicated a fill when the actual order did not fill. False Neg. = the simulation indicated the order did not fill when it did. 1 QI = quote improving, i.e., an order with a limit price between the existing New York Stock Exchange bid and offer prices. OTQ = on the quote, i.e., a buy (sell) order with the limit price equal to the NYSE bid (offer) price. 2 The fill rate is the percent of orders submitted that fully execute on the day submitted. NYSE = New York Stock Exchange, PHLX = Philadelphia Stock Exchange. The column labeled difference is the PHLX fill rate less the NYSE fill rate. Three asterisks indicate that the hypothetical NYSE fill rate differs from the actual PHLX fill rate at the .01 level using a Chi-squared test between proportions with one degree of freedom. 3 Hypothetical orders in the "Shares" column execute because the number of shares executing at the limit price after the submission time equals the depth associated with the limit price at the time the limit order is submitted plus the size of the order. Hypothetical orders in the "Trade" ("Quote") column execute because we observe a transaction (quote) price that is inferior to the limit price (order-receipt-time quoted price). 4 To compute return, we compare the end-of-day national best bid (offer) price with the transaction price for filled buy (sell) orders. Filled buy (sell) orders in which the price rises (falls) have positive return figures. The number reported is the mean share-weighted figure. 5 Total return difference subtracts the total return available for the hypothetical NYSE execution from the total return available from the actual regional execution. 6 The per share difference is this total difference from the adjacent column divided by the total number of shares in the sample category. 7 The wait time is the time required to fully execute the order. It is computed only for completely filled orders. 8 The difference column is the PHLX mean execution wait less the NYSE mean execution rate. Three asterisks indicate that the mean hypothetical NYSE execution wait time differs from the mean actual PHLX execution wait time using a two-tailed t-test at the .01 significance level. 9 The order-pairs in which the actual PHLX order executes no later than the hypothetical NYSE order as a percent of the total orders in the indicated category. Asterisks denote that the indicated percentage differs from 50% at the .01 significance level using a Chi-squared test. 
